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The Inevitibility of Regional Variation in the United Kingdom
Abstract
First, the general history of the different regions must be considered, to the degree that explains innate
qualities of specific regions. This can assist in understanding the roots of regional variation. Second, the
situation of regional governance in the UK is important as it is the vehicle by which the current situation has
risen and progress and change can be made. Third, it is best to look at both the history and current situation of
economic statistics with special regard to regional differences in GDP per capita and the unemployment rate.
Also to be considered is the idea of a “regional problem” and the criteria that collectively determine what
qualifies as a problem. And fourth, I will explain the differences and hypothesize as to why they exist and what
will happen in the future. I will look at the theoretical imbalance in the government through population and
social analysis, and the practical imbalances through economic analysis. Through this, I intend to show the
inevitability of regional imbalance in the UK. Moreover, the UK government must recognize these issues as
regional and move to set up regional governments to aid the situation and improve each region. Inequity is
inevitable, but when a large inequity is present, the government must intercede to diminish it.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol13/iss1/18
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I. INTRODUCTION
The most recent progress in the UnitedKingdom to confront issues of regional imbal-ance was New Labour’s move to form the
Scottish Parliament and Welsh and Northern Ireland
Assemblies.  The movement was brought forth to rec-
ognize and decrease some of the regional variations
that exist in the UK.  However, this legislation did not
consider the many regional issues within England,
and has left the entire UK government with an imbal-
ance in representation.  Since part of the reason to
devolve governance was to increase local economic
control, it should be noted that there are differences
between regions in
England that are
as wide as the
d i f f e r e n c e s
between England
and Scotland or
Wales.  To better
understand these
issues, why they
exist, and what can be done (if anything) to solve
them, a few ideas must also be analyzed that parallel
the issue of regionalization and devolution.  
First, the general history of the different
regions must be considered, to the degree that
explains innate qualities of specific regions.  This can
assist in understanding the roots of regional variation.
Second, the situation of regional governance in the
UK is important as it is the vehicle by which the cur-
rent situation has risen and progress and change can
be made.  Third, it is best to look at both the history
and current situation of economic statistics with spe-
cial regard to regional differences in GDP per capita
and the unemployment rate.  Also to be considered is
the idea of a “regional problem” and the criteria that
collectively determine what qualifies as a problem.
And fourth, I will explain the differences and hypoth-
esize as to why they exist and what will happen in the
future.  I will look at the theoretical imbalance in the
government through population and social analysis,
and the practical imbalances through economic
analysis.  Through this, I intend to show the
inevitability of regional imbalance in the UK.
Moreover, the UK government must recognize these
issues as regional and move to set up regional gov-
ernments to aid the situation and improve each
region.  Inequity is inevitable, but when a large
inequity is present, the government must intercede to
diminish it.  
II. HISTORY OF UK REGIONS: ACCEPTABLE
IMBALANCE
There are
some types of
i n e q u i t i e s
between regions
that are tolerable.
Since, at the very
least, the 18th
century, London
has been a global power in the finance and trade.
“During the course of the 18th century, City mer-
chants, ship owners, and bankers gained large for-
tunes from maritime trade and the acquisition of new
colonies” (Clout, 70).  The economic prominence of
London can possibly be traced back even further to
the guilds and livery companies from the 16th and
17th centuries.  Whatever way one views the situa-
tion, London has always been, comparatively speak-
ing, more economically advanced than the rest of the
UK.  Because of its proximity to the North Sea via the
Thames, its political importance, and its rich econom-
ic history, it is inevitable that London will continue as
an economic power, especially relative to other
regions in the UK.  
Just as London’s history is important to its
economic position at the present, the manufacturing
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“There are differences between regions in
England that are as wide as the differences
between England and Scotland or Wales.”
sector has had great influence on cities in northern
England.  Because of the large decline in the manu-
facturing sector — partly due to the decrease in coal
consumption and the increase in international steel
competition — the northern areas of England have
begun to decline economically.  Part of this decline is
inevitable; certain industries can eventually fall and
the dependence on one specific industry by a region
can cause a problem.  This type of inequity is
inevitable and can be explained by the theory of cap-
italism.  There is and should be no method of decreas-
ing these inequities.  However, to what degree the
decline should be allowed is the question.  The point
at which the decline should be confronted and policy
should be implemented to counteract it is a matter I
will consider in Section V.    
III. REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS: DEVOLU-
TION
In the 1970s, it was decided to promote
regional issues and to help shift tripartite regional
strategy to have more of “a concentration on the
regional economy, social welfare, and allocation of
public expenditure” (Hogwood, 188).  Despite the
movement toward establishment of regional govern-
ments in the UK, the late 1970s attempts failed due to
improper organisation and a lack of general public
support.  The next major movement was in 1998,
when Tony Blair and his New Labour government
held referenda to determine the best route for devolu-
tion in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland
(O’Neill, 171).  The biggest result of the ensuing leg-
islation was the
Scottish Parliament,
which has full leg-
islative power in all
areas except
defense, elections,
and foreign affairs.
The Welsh
Assembly contrasts
this, with Cardiff possessing fewer powers; essential-
ly, “the Welsh Assembly has executive but no pri-
mary legislative functions enjoyed by the Scottish
Parliament” (O’Neill, 185).  
The Northern Ireland Assembly, though cur-
rently suspended due to the religious conflict, pos-
sesses similar attributes to the Welsh Assembly in
terms of what it is allowed to govern.  However, more
important in the situation is the Assembly’s ability to
consider both the Protestant and the Catholic side.  Its
assembly of 108 and executive of 12 are even num-
bers so as to give equal representation to both sides.
Also, the First Minister and the Deputy Minister must
be of opposing parties, with the First Minister from
the majority party and the Deputy Minister from the
lead opposition party.  This allows for there to be
equal consideration at both the executive and assem-
bly levels in an attempt to appease the religious tur-
moil and estab-
lish a government
that will success-
fully consider
both sides.  What
the Northern
Ireland situation
shows us, more
than the Scottish
or Welsh govern-
ments, is that
each devolved
government is
tailored to the
region, recogniz-
ing the differ-
ences that exist
between them.  
However,
if one were to look at the population of the four
nations: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern
Ireland, and then would consider how the regional
governments are set up, it would be clear that there is
an imbalance.  For
example, Scotland,
a nation of 5 mil-
lion people pos-
sesses far higher
control than the
people of Wales, a
nation of 3 million
people.  England,
with a population of just fewer than 50 million, has
many of its issues voted on by MPs from Scotland,
Wales, and Northern Ireland.  Through simply look-
ing at the population in the different regions of the
UK, it is evident that the regional control is superior
in certain areas over others.  Scotland’s population is
very similar in size to that of 4 regions in England:
Southwest, East, West Midlands, and Yorkshire and
the Humber.  Only 3 English regions have a popula-
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TABLE 1 
Regional Population  
  Region 
Population 
(2001) 
  
United 
Kingdom 58,788,990 
North East  2,520,462 
North West  6,728,562 
N
or
th
 
Yorkshire and 
the Humber  4,961,376 
East Midlands  4,182,676 
C
en
tra
l 
West Midlands  5,264,190 
East 5,389,020 
London 7,187,184 
South East  8,008,980 So
ut
h 
South West  4,934,259 
England 49,246,218 
Wales 2,902,480 
Scotland 5,064,200 
U
K
 N
at
io
ns
 
Northern 
Ireland 1,689,258 
“England has always been, comparatively
speaking, more economically advanced
than the rest of the UK.”
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tion that is significantly greater than Scotland:
London, Southeast, and Northwest, while the
Northeast and East Midlands have populations signif-
icantly less.  Though proportionately it would make
sense for the regions of England to devolve, the situ-
ation is better analyzed with economic statistics to
see the greater picture in terms of the imbalance. 
IV. ECONOMICS STATISTICS: PAST AND
PRESENT
The economic differences between the
regions — especially within England — also indicate
that there is a need to improve certain regions.  For
there to be a “regional problem”, or severe inequality
between regions and the national averages, there
must be five specific statistical qualifications: low
growth of GDP per capita, high and persistent unem-
ployment, dependence on a heavy industrial base,
decline in manufacturing, inadequate infrastructure,
and net migration out of the region (Griffiths, 194).
The “north versus south” issue has been plaguing
England since the decline of the manufacturing sec-
tor.  The Northeast, Northwest, and Yorkshire and the
Humber regions have all experienced some sort of
regional problem.  In turn, I will present and analyze
statistics that represent the regional problem, as
defined or otherwise.  
GDP per capita steadily declined in the north-
ern regions and rose in the southern regions from
1989 to 1999.  The three regions in the north under-
went a significant decrease, and three of the four
regions in the south have remained the only regions
steadily above the UK average.  While the mar-
ket theory suggests that these should at some
point in time converge without intervention, it
seems as if they are diverging at steady rates
with little sign of relenting.  Granted, a change
of 1-2 points is not extraordinary, as in the case
of the West Midlands, London, and Southeast.
But the change that underwent in the East,
Northwest, and Northeast is quite significant
and is possibly beyond the realm of explanation
by the market theory.  There might be a force
acting upon those regions that is making its suc-
cess or failure artificially high.  I will examine
this in Section V.  
Another imbalance that exists is in aver-
age household income.  The household income
of the north is significantly smaller than the UK
average, while the income of the southern regions is
substantially higher than the average.  Given that
some of the difference can be attributed to the higher
cost of living in areas such as London, the data still
outweigh the differences as the major cities in the UK
have a similar cost of living. Again, the north-south
divide is made evident as the household income in the
north is between 50 and 100 pounds lower than the
UK average and in the Southeast and London it is 106
to 135 pounds greater than the UK average.  Though
this is not a factor in determining the regional prob-
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TABLE 2 
GDP per capita  
  Region GDP per capita  
  UK Average = 100  1981 1989 1999 
Change 
from 1981-
1999 
North East  94.3 83.9 77.3 -17 
North West  94.3 91.3 86.9 -7.4 
N
or
th
 
Yorkshire and the 
Humber 93 89.3 87.9 -5.1 
East Midlands  100 96.6 93.6 -6.4 
C
en
tra
l 
West Midlands  90.6 91.8 91.7 1.1 
East    97.3 114.2 116.4 19.1 
London N/A 128.5 130 1.5 
South East  115 111.6 116.4 1.4 So
ut
h 
South West  95.9 92.5 90.8 -5.1 
England N/A 102.3 102.4 0.1 
Wales 88.4 84 80.5 -7.9 
Scotland 98.7 95.6 96.5 -2.2 
U
K
 N
at
io
ns
 
Northern Ireland  74.3 74.7 77.5 3.2 
TABLE 3 
Household Income  
  Region 
Mean 
Weekly 
Household 
Income 
(£) 
  United Kingdom  480 
North East  380 
North West  430 
N
or
th
 
Yorkshire and the 
Humber 432 
East Midlands  449 
C
en
tra
l 
West Midlands  462 
East 510 
London  615 
South East  586 So
ut
h 
South West  449 
England  496 
Wales  376 
Scotland  419 U
K
 
N
at
io
ns
 
Northern Ireland  370 
lem as defined by Griffiths and Wall, it is quite
indicative of quality of living, types of jobs, and over-
all wealth of a region. 
There has been no net migration out of the
regions in England due to a strong increase in emi-
grants to England.  However, if the net migration sta-
tistics are compared between the regions, it is evident
that the poorest regions have experienced little or no
growth in comparison to the rapid migration into the
richer regions.  In this regard, it can still qualify as a
regional problem as a large percentage of people are
not moving into the regions but are strengthening and
moving into others.  
The reliance on industry of the individual
regions has been apparent since for the last few
decades.  In spite of the aggregate move toward serv-
ice businesses and away from manufacturing, the
divide is still apparent today.  Again, the north-south
divide is quite evident in the statistics.  Industry
accounts for a significantly lower percentage in the
south as only the Southwest is at the same level of
industrial contribution to GDP.  However, all regions
other than the four in the south still experience indus-
trial contribution to GDP on a higher level than the
UK average.  The regions with the highest GDP have
the lowest percentage of industrial contribution, and
vice versa.  
The final statistic I will examine is that of
unemployment.  Since 1998, it has declined a whole
percentage point in the UK, but this decline is repre-
sented regionally in various ways.  The Northeast has
been consistently 1.5 to 2 points higher than the aver-
age, as has London.  This goes against the typical
profile of London as a prosperous and economically
above-average region; it is possibly due to the large
number of people living in a confined area vying for
a confined number of jobs.  Nonetheless, three of the
four most affluent regions — the Southeast, East, and
Southwest — have the lowest unemployment and are
substantially below the national average.  The less
wealthy regions are slightly above, with the excep-
tion of the Northeast, which is quite far above the
level.  
What these statistics show us is that the
Northeast — with its high unemployment, low GDP
per capita, low household income, high industry, and
stagnant population relative to the UK averages — is
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TABLE 4 
Net Migration1 
  Region 1991 2000 
North East  2 -1 
North West  -12 2 
N
or
th
 
Yorkshire and the 
Humber 7 20 
East Midlands  15 17 
C
en
tra
l 
West Midlands  -9 1 
East 16 34 
London  -17 55 
South East  28 18 So
ut
h 
South West  23 39 
England  53 185 
Wales  6 5 
Scotland  15 -5 U
K
 
N
at
io
ns
 
Northern Ireland  2 -1 
1Net migration in thousands of people  
TABLE 5 
Percent of GDP from Sectors (2001)  
  Region 
Manufacturing 
(%) 
Service 
(%) 
  United Kingdom  28.2 70.4 
North East  36.2 63.0 
North West  32.8 66.2 
N
or
th
 
Yorkshire & the Humber  34.6 63.8 
East Midlands  36.7 61.3 
C
en
tra
l 
West Midlands  37.4 61.2 
East 25.1 73.3 
London  16.6 83.4 
South East  22.4 76.8 So
ut
h 
South West 28.6 68.9 
England  27.6 71.2 
Wales  34.8 63.4 
Scotland  31.8 66.2 U
K
 
N
at
io
ns
 
Northern Ireland  27.7 68.3 
 
TABLE 6 
Unemployment in those of 
Working Age 
  % of working age Umemp.  1998 2002 
  United Kingdom  6.3 5.2 
North East  8.2 6.9 
North West  6.7 5.5 
N
or
th
 
Yorkshire and the Humber  7.1 5.4 
East Midlands  4.9 4.2 
C
en
tra
l 
West Midlands  6.4 5.5 
East 5.1 3.5 
London  8.2 6.6 
South East  4.4 4 So
ut
h 
South West  4.6 3.6 
England  6.1 4.9 
Wales  6.8 6.1 
Scotland  7.5 6.8 
U
K
 N
at
io
ns
 
Northern Ireland  7.4 5.6 
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the one region that has a substantial “regional prob-
lem”.  London, the East, and especially the Southeast,
all have profiles opposite to the Northeast and have
continued their economic superiority through the last
few decades.  Yorkshire, the Northwest, and both
Midlands regions are typically below the UK aver-
ages in most of the statistical areas, but to a far less-
er degree than the
Northeast when
all of the statistics
are considered.  
V. ANALYSIS
As more
companies spring
up in the service
sector and manu-
facturing compa-
nies shrink and
outsource, the
richer areas that had always been reliant on the serv-
ice sector (e.g. London and the Southeast) will
become richer and the poorer, manufacturing-cen-
tered regions (e.g. Northeast and Yorkshire) will
become poorer (Notes, 16/11).  Though the govern-
ment tries to foster convergence to more equal pros-
perity, the experience has been that there is actual
divergence in which rich regions are becoming richer
and poor regions are becoming poorer.  
This is due to a number of reasons.  First, the
labor market suffers because the jobs lost are often
not replaced by service sector jobs, they are simply
moved to other regions, causing higher unemploy-
ment.  Second, the younger generations find that
there are less opportunities in the poorer regions and
decide to be educated and work in the richer and
more prosperous areas, causing an outflow of produc-
tive labor from the poor regions.  Third, as the busi-
nesses fail and become less productive, the amount of
money granted to and raised by the community
through taxes and philanthropy decreases, causing
the maintenance and building of infrastructure to fal-
ter.  These factors cause the GDP per capita to
decrease in the long run.  This is a cyclical example
of how the poor become poorer, and the point at
which the decline becomes endemic is when the gov-
ernment must intercede.  
I believe regional governments work better
than the UK Parliament in assisting fallen regions and
preventing a divergent economy.  The regional gov-
ernments are able to better promote their interests and
work toward solving the issues to make them more
competitive and viable.  To enhance the draw on
labor and capital from other regions, the government
must be able to set policies that give incentives to
potential entrants.  Also, there must be a strong infra-
structure set up to aid in the transport of goods and
capital and to
make the poten-
tial for expansion
i n c r e a s e .
Promotion of
growth of the
region’s interests
causes the GDP
per capita to
increase and
unemployment to
fall. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The regional variations in the United
Kingdom, though it is a relatively small country, are
accounted for by a combination of elements.  First,
the history of a region and its economy, even dating
back a few centuries, can impact a region far into its
future.  The effect of finance on London 400 years
ago, combined with the northern dependence on colo-
nial industrialization 150 years ago impacts the
economies of these regions today.  Second, the
regional governance that is currently in action affects
the regional variations, but it is a force that works to
counteract them (in situations such as Scotland and
Wales) to bring the region back up to or above the UK
average levels.  Third, along with the social history of
an area, the statistical history of an area can often
determine how a region can tailspin into a regional
problem and the effects of it maintaining its position
at the bottom of the scale.  
All of these contribute to the economic posi-
tion of a region, but the cause is an outside force that
acts upon the situation in a specific region.  The sta-
tistics are merely the explanatory variables following
the change.  However, the impetus behind the change
lies in certain outside forces acting on regional pre-
dispositions.  For example, as the manufacturing sec-
tor rose in the 1950s due to rebuilding efforts after the
war and the large need for steel, it was prone to
decline due to the lack of a need for coal and the
declining rebuilding efforts.  The further move
John Haugen
A regional economic problem exists if there
is low growth of GDP per capita, high and
persistent unemployment, dependence on a
heavy industrial base, decline in manufac-
turing, inadequate infrastructure, and net
migration of the region.
toward the service sector sealed the fate of many
northern cities.  The outside forces cause the change
to occur, but the only reason the economic statistics
changed and the regions went into decline was due to
the heavy dependence on manufacturing.  As this is
the case, there is no method of halting an outside vari-
able; rather, these forces, whether they are unexpect-
ed or not, cannot entirely be prevented.  They are the
reason that the regional inequities persist and the his-
tories of the regions play into the equation.  
As such, the inequities between regions are
represented by different concentrations and types of
business, labor, demographical tendencies, jobs,
wealth, and political power.  These differences are
inevitable because of history coupled with the
unavoidable forces that act on a country.  I believe
that a government should allow these inequities to
exist, however, it must be on a natural level.  As soon
as the problem becomes common and recurring, the
government must take measures to help it improve as
naturally as it can.  Building up infrastructure and
providing incentives to private enterprise as well as
social programs to help counteract the destructive
effects of unemployment, can be the fastest and most
durable form of aid to break the cyclical and
inevitable form of inequity.  
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